Human Error Management Paying Emphasis on Decision Making and Social Intelligence 
-Beyond the Framework of Man-Machine Interface Design- by Murata, Atsuo
Human Error Management Paying Emphasis on 
Decision Making and Social Intelligence 
-Beyond the Framework of Man-Machine Interface Design- 
 
Atsuo MURATA 
Dept. of Intelligent Mechanical Systems, Division of Industrial Innovation Sciences,  
Graduate School of Natural Science and Technology, Okayama University 
3-1-1, Tsushimanaka, Okayama-shi, Japan 
E-mail: murata@iims.sys.okayama-u.ac.jp 
 
Abstract― How latent error or violation induces a 
serious accident has been reviewed and a proper 
addressing measure of this has been proposed in 
the framework of decision making, emotional 
intelligence (EI) and social intelligence (SI) of 
organization and its members. It has been clarified 
that EI and SI play an important role in decision 
making. Violations frequently occur all over the 
world, although we definitely understand that we 
should not commit violations, and a secret to 
prevent this might exist in the enhancement of both 
social intelligence and reliability. The construction 
of social structure or system that supports 
organizational efforts to enhance both social 
intelligence and reliability would be essential. 
Traditional safety education emphasizes that it is 
possible to change attitudes or mind toward safety 
by means of education. In spite of this，accidents or 
scandals frequently occur and never decrease. 
These problems must be approached on the basis 
of the full understanding of social intelligence and 
limited reasonability in decision making. Social 
dilemma (We do not necessarily cooperate in spite 
of understanding its importance, and we sometimes 
make decision not to select cooperative behavior. 
Non-cooperation gives rise to a desirable result for 
an individual. However, if all take non-cooperative 
actions, undesirable results are finally induced to 
all.) must be solved in some ways and the transition 
from relief (closed) society to global (reliability) 
society must be realized as a whole. New social 
system, where cooperative relation can be easily 
and reliably obtained, must be constructed to 
support such an approach and prevent 
violation-based accidents. 
 
1. Introduction 
As a part of our daily activities, we make mistakes 
or commit errors. We cannot spend a day without 
committing errors. Swain and Guttman [1] defined a 
human error as an output of tolerance action, where 
the limits of tolerable performance are defined by the 
system. Reason [2] regarded a human error as a 
generic term to encompass all occasions where a 
planned sequence of mental or physical activity fails 
to achieve its intended outcome, and an error cannot 
be attributed to some chance level. Hollangel [3] 
defined an error as an action which fails to produce 
the expected result and/or gives rise to an unwanted 
consequence. Meister [4] interpreted a human error as 
follows: A failure of a common sequence of 
psychological functions such as stimulus, organism, 
and response that are basic to human behavior. When 
any element of such a sequence is broken (failure of 
perceived stimulus, misinterpretation of meaning of 
stimulus, do not know how to respond to stimulus, 
etc.), a perfect execution cannot be achieved.  
No human action stands alone. It is a part of a 
sequential cognitive process. Therefore, a human error 
must be understood in the context of human 
information processing. It must be noted that every 
error does not necessarily lead to a critical accident or 
a scandal. The understanding of error property and 
preventing it from developing a crucial accident is a 
very important aspect of human error or safety 
engineering research.  
First, the classification of human error is carried 
out to understand the property of human error 
referring to the published research results [5]-[10]. 
Second, the prevention strategies of human errors or 
accidents are described, and the limitation of 
strategies practiced until now will be discussed.  
There are following prevention measures of 
human error: 
(a)Proper design of man-machine system according 
to the principle “Fitting the task to the man” 
(b)Proper management of fatigue, workload, and 
stress 
(c)Safety education paying emphasis on emotion 
(d)Enhancement of sensitivity to errors 
The measure (b) should be managed properly, 
because it is possible that low arousal, high workload, 
or high stress leads to human errors such as drowsy 
operation of machines or vehicles. The measures (c) 
and (d) are intensively discussed in this paper, because 
the prevention of violations stemming from lack in (c) 
and (d) is regarded as an effective method to the 
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reduction of accidents or scandals due to improper 
organizational or managerial strategies. On the basis 
of such discussion, the concept of human error 
management must be carried out not only within the 
framework of man-machine system but also in the 
framework of organizational design [11] and social 
intelligence [12]-[13].   
As for the approach from the viewpoints of 
organizational design, Desai and Roberts [11] 
discussed the relationship between safety climate of 
organization and recent accidents, and concluded that 
recent accidents may be associated with safety climate 
score. The improvement of safety climate might be 
one promising measure to prevent accidents. On the 
other hand, there exist no effective measures that 
made an attempt to prevent accidents or human errors 
(especially, violation) from the viewpoints of social 
intelligence [12]-[13] and limited reasonability in 
human’s decision making [14]-[15].   
As shown in Section 2, the most critical human 
error is (intentional) violation. Different from other 
types of errors such as slip, lapse, and mistake which 
are committed without intention, the violation is 
committed intentionally. Although we know that the 
violation is not permitted, many wrongly 
underestimate the risk of violation and overestimate 
the benefit obtained by individuals or organizations. 
This is indicative of limited reasonability or cognitive 
bias of risk proposed by prospect theory [14]-[15]. 
Without proper understanding of limited reasonability, 
interaction between IQ and EI (emotional intelligence) 
(We believe that this is promoted by the function of 
social intelligence (SI)), and human’s cognitive bias in 
decision making, we cannot prevent violation-based 
accidents or scandals. Therefore, the measures (c) and 
(d) above are intensively discussed in this paper. The 
main purpose of this paper is to approach the 
underlying mechanism of violation from multiple 
perspectives, and propose a model that can explain 
violations. 
 
2. Classification of human errors and under- 
standing its property 
Reason [7] classified human error as violation, 
mistake, slip, and lapse. This taxonomy allows the 
attribution of a possible origin to an error and to locate 
it in one of the three stages of cognitive information 
processing, that is, conception (planning), storage of 
information, and execution of an action sequence. 
Violation is intentionally committed. Mistakes are due 
to wrong plan, where an action is executed according 
to the plan and the intention, but the plan is wrong. 
Lapses occur due to retention deficits. In this type of 
error, the intention is not retrieved or recalled on time 
or at all. Slips occur under the correct plan due to 
the wrong execution, because the action is not 
appropriate to the plan. It must be noted that we do 
not intentionally commit mistakes, lapses, and slips.   
The type of errors mentioned above does not 
capture all the ways in which humans contributes to 
major accidents. An adequate framework for aberrant 
behaviors requires a distinction between errors and 
violations. Both can be present within the same action 
sequence, but they can occur independently. While 
one may make an error such as slips, lapses, and 
mistakes without committing a violation, a violation 
need not involve errors. Slips [16] and lapses 
correspond to the unwitting deviation of action from 
intention, and mistakes correspond to the departure of 
planned actions from a goal. These errors offer only a 
partial account of the possible varieties of aberrant 
behavior. For the most part, humans do not plan and 
execute their actions in isolation, but within regulated 
social environment. While error may be defined in 
relation to the cognitive processes of the individual, 
violations can only be described with regard to a 
social context in which behavior is governed by 
operating procedures, code of practice, rules and so on. 
Therefore, violations can be defined as intentional 
deviations from those practices deemed necessary to 
maintain the safe operation of a potentially hazardous 
system. What is certain is that dangerous aberrations 
cannot be prevented within the framework of either 
the cognitive or the social psychological approach. 
Both approaches must be integrated within a single 
framework.  
There are some cases where violations do not have 
some degree of intentionality. The cases where one 
doesn’t know the rule or doesn’t have proper 
knowledge are examples of such a violation.  When 
the risk is underestimated, it is possible that a 
violation is committed in order to obtain higher 
efficiency. According to Reason [7], violations can be 
classified into two types: routine violations and 
exceptional violations. Routine violations are related 
with the two habitual violations: (1) a natural human 
tendency to take the path of least effort, and (2)a 
relatively indifferent environment where, for example, 
violations are rarely punished. Exceptional violations 
are not so clearly specified. This type of violation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Slip
Lapse
Mistake
Violation
Without intention
intentionally
Human error
Figure 1. Taxonomy of human errors based on Reason 
[7]. 
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 Table 1. Taxonomy of human errors based on the 
cognitive stages.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Taxonomy of human errors on the basis of the 
cognitive layer model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
seems to be related to tasks or operating 
circumstances that make violation inevitable. 
Different from the errors such as slips, lapses, and 
mistakes based on the cognitive science, the 
underlying mechanism of violations is not well 
documented. To carry out this (clarify the mechanism 
of violation), an interdisciplinary approach including 
social psychology, organizational design and 
psychology, social neuroscience, and cognitive 
science, especially humans’ decision making process 
is essential. The taxonomy based on Reason [7] is 
summarized in Figure 1. In Table 1, the taxonomy of 
error is summarized according to the cognitive stages 
at which they occur. 
Rasmussen [9]-[10] classified human error on the 
basis of cognitive layer model (skill-, rule-, and 
knowledge-based models) as follows: Knowledge- 
based mistakes, rule-based mistakes, and skill-based 
errors such as slips and lapses (See Table 2). When we 
interpret the three errors in the framework of cognitive 
stage, the knowledge-, rule-, and skill-based error 
corresponds to formulation of intention, planning of 
action, and storage of information, respectively. 
Norman [16] classified errors as follows: error in the 
formation of intention, error in activation of schemas, 
and error in triggering of active schemas, which 
corresponds to formation of intention, execution of 
action, and execution of action, respectively. 
As shown in Figure 2, errors can also be classified 
as variable, constant, and sporadic errors. Each shows 
a pattern of shot by different riflemen. The pattern of 
variable errors exhibits no constant error, only a large 
amount of variable error. The pattern of constant 
errors shows the reverse: a large constant error, but 
small variable error. These two errors are predictable. 
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Figure 2. Variable, constant, and sporadic errors.  Cognitive layer Error type
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Figure 3.Systemic and random errors. 
 
The lack in knowledge and skill is the main cause of 
constant error. The variable error occurs due to the 
insufficient design, regulation, and procedure. It is 
impossible to predict sporadic error. Suddenly, the 
shot is deviated from the center. This cause must due 
to the brain characteristic, such as overstressed state. 
In Figure 3, comparison of systemic and random 
errors after system improvements are shown. While 
the systemic error can be improved by means of a 
proper approach such as an ergonomic design, it must 
be noted that random error cannot be entirely 
eliminated.  
Latent and active errors are also another 
classification of human errors. Active errors become 
immediately obvious at, or soon after, the time when 
the error is committed, especially when there is a 
close association between the task and the error. On 
the other hand, the consequence of a latent error is not 
immediate due to the inherent latency. When a latent 
error occurs, it is possible to complete the sequence of 
tasks without the error being revealed. In the case of 
an active error, the sequence of tasks cannot be 
completed. Such a nature of latent errors makes them 
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more insidious than active errors.  The latent errors 
occur during maintenance operations and in the 
context of management decision making. It is well 
known that may serious accidents have resulted from 
latent errors in maintenance activities such as aviation 
industry and nuclear power plant. An error gradually 
revealed without human identifying the error, and 
there existed many cases where this led to serious and 
crucial accidents. Most management errors are latent 
in their effects.  Decision making errors are always 
latent and their effects can be delayed for extremely 
long periods of time before errors are detected, and it 
is possible that this leads to a crucial accident without 
the error being detected.  
Using the explosion at the Nypro chemical works 
at Flixborough in 1974, the latent error is explained. 
When a split developed in one of the reactors, a 
decision was made by management to replace the 
reactor with a temporary 20 inch diameter bypass pipe 
connected to the adjoining reactors by expansion 
bellows and inadequately supported by temporal 
scaffolding. The arrangement was subsequently found 
to be vulnerable to unforeseen mechanical stress when 
operating at high pressure or subject to mechanical 
impact due to the propagation through the system of 
slug of liquid reactant. A failure of the bypass pipe 3 
months after its installation eventually led to an 
immense aerial explosion which lost 28 lives and 
damaged the factory and surrounding villages.  
This type error is strongly related to the violation 
arising inside the organization. The omission of 
maintenance duty, which corresponds to the violation 
in the maintenance task, leaves the latent error, and 
this error gradually degraded the system, revealed, and 
eventually led to a serious accident.  
In this paper, how violations induce serious 
accidents has been discussed and a proper addressing 
measure to prevent this would be presented in the 
framework of limited reasonability in decision making 
and social intelligence of organization and its 
members. 
 
3. Analysis of causes of human error or accident 
3.1 Accident at Bhopal Union Carbide Corporation  
On the night of 2-3, December, 1984, a gas leaked 
from a pesticide plant owned by a subsidiary of Union 
Carbide Corporation. This accident devastated Bhopal, 
and was the worst industrial disaster ever. About 3,800 
people were killed, and more than 200,000 were 
injured. This revealed the largely unrealized danger 
associated with the manufacture of highly toxic 
chemicals (in this case, methyl isocyanate (MIC)). 
The immediate cause of this accident was an 
influx of water into a MIC storage tank. How the 
accident occurred is a tangled combination of botched 
maintenance, operator error, improvised bypass pipes, 
failed safety system, incomplete management, drought, 
agricultural economics, and poor government 
decisions.  
Management errors can be summarized as follows. 
(1)Locating a high risk plant to a densely populated 
residential area. 
(2)Poor emphasis on system safety (invest little 
money on safety). 
(3)No improvement in safety measures despite six 
prior minor accidents. 
(4)Storing 10 times more MIC than was needed daily. 
(5)Poor evacuation measures. 
(6)Neglect of factory inspector’s warning on washing 
MIC lines. 
(7)Failure to release telex message on MIC treatment. 
Human error (mainly failure in situation 
awareness due to lack in knowledge) strongly 
associated with management error can be listed as 
below. 
(1)Heavy reliance on inexperienced operators and 
supervisors. 
(2)Reduction in operating and maintenance staff due 
to management policy of cost reduction. 
(3)Employing non-trained and inexperienced 
superintendents due to management policy of cost 
reduction. 
(4)Re-pressuring the tank when it failed to get 
pressurized once. 
(5)Issuing orders for washing when MIC tank failed to 
re-pressurize. 
(6)Did not operate warning siren until leak became 
severe. 
(7)Switching off siren immediately after starting it. 
(8)Failure to recognize that pressure rise was 
abnormal. 
(9)Failure to use empty MIC tank to release pressure. 
Hardware error can be pointed out as follows. 
(1)Insufficient scrubber capacity. 
(2)No automatic sensors to warn of temperature 
increase. 
(3)Manual mechanism for switching off scrubber. 
(4)No online monitor for MIC tanks. 
(5)No indicator for monitoring position of valves in 
control room. 
(6)Refrigeration plant not operational. 
(7)No operation of pressure and temperature 
indicators. 
(8)Insufficient availability of gas masks. 
(9)Disconnection of flare tower. 
(10)Inactive mode of vent gas scrubber. 
(11)Use of iron pipes for transporting MIC. 
As mentioned, management (organizational) errors 
or violations, together with human errors and 
hardware (machine) errors, led to such a disaster.  
 
3.2 NASA challenger accident 
The cause of the Space Shuttle Challenger 
accident on the morning of 28 January, 1986 was the 
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shortly split of rubbery seal called an O-ring. An 
O-ring on one of the solid rocket boosters split shortly 
after lift-off, releasing a jet of ignited fuel that caused 
the entire shuttle complex to explode. The related 
management errors can be summarized as follows.  
In 1977, during the test firing of solid rocket 
booster, Thiokol engineers discovered that casing 
joints expanded. They persuaded NASA that this was 
not desirable but acceptable. They also found that one 
of the two O-ring joint seals frequently became 
unseated, thus failing to provide backup as firstly 
designed. In 1981, NASA planned two lightweight 
versions of the boosters (steel and carbon filament) in 
order to increase payload. Hercules submitted an 
improved design for the carbon filament), 
incorporating a lip at the joint to prevent the O-ring 
from unseating. In spite of this Thiokol continued to 
use unmodified joints for its steel boosters. Erosion 
was noticed on one of the six primary O-rings which 
was the same joint that was involved in the Challenger 
accident. In 1982, NASA upgraded the criticality 
rating on the joints to 1, meaning that the failure of 
this component lead to critical accident. Although 
some NASA engineers seek to adapt Hercules capture 
feature into the new thinner boosters in 1983, the 
proposal was shelved and the old joints continued to 
be used.  
In 1984, just before the 10th launch of shuttle, 
high pressure air tests were carried out on the booster 
joints. An inch long scorch was found on one of the 
primary O-rings. Despite the above mentioned 
criticality 1 rating, Marshall Space Center reported 
that no remedial action was necessary. Moreover, on 
11th launch, one of the primary O-rings was found to 
be breached altogether. In spite of this, no action was 
taken by NASA.  
In 1985, breaches were found on four of the 
booster joints. Weather at launch was the coldest to 
date (51 deg F with 53 deg F at the joints). On the 
17th launch, the primary O-ring in the nozzle joint 
failed to seal, and scorching was found all the way 
round the joint. NASA booster manager placed a 
launch constraint so that no launch can take place if 
there were any worries about a “criticality 1” item. 
Top NASA management was still unaware of this 
constraint. Thiokol engineer wrote a memo warning of 
catastrophe if a blowout should occur in a field joint. 
Marshall and Thiokol engineers met in Washington to 
discuss this problem. NASA management missed this 
meeting. This could not have been solved until the 
launch of Challenger. Unfortunately, on the night 
before the launch, the temperature fell into 20 deg F 
colder than the previous coldest launch a year earlier. 
At this point, Allan McDonald, Thiokol’s chief 
engineer at the Kennedy Space Center attempted to 
stop the launch.  
The cause of this disastrous accident is a 
complicated combination of incompetence, selective 
blindness (groupthink (in detail, see 5.2), conflicting 
goals and reversed logic. The organizational 
(management) error hindered the stop of launch in 
spite of some engineer groups recognized the risk of 
launching without the deficiencies improved.  
 
3.3 Chernobyl accident 
The related management errors can be 
summarized as follows. At 13:00 on 25 April, 1986, 
power reduction started with the intention of 
achieving test conditions. The tests were planned to be 
carried out at 25% full power. In this event, 
organizational (managerial) error and violations are 
included. The test was to see whether the coast- down 
capacity of a turbine generator would be sufficient, 
given an appropriate voltage generator, to power the 
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) for a few 
minutes. This would fill the time to get the diesel 
standby generator into operation. A voltage generator 
had been tested on two previous occasions, but had 
failed due to rapid voltage fall-off. The goal of the test 
was to carry out repeated checking prior to the annual 
maintenance shutdown to be scheduled in the near 
future. Authority to carry out the test was given to the 
staff without the approval of the Safety Technical 
Group. In addition, it was generally very dangerous to 
carry out such tests in RBMK type plants on safety 
grounds.  Making matters worse, the staff (electrical 
engineers) had little knowledge on reactor plants. 
At 14:00, the ECCS was disconnected from the 
primary circuit. This stripped the plant of one of its 
main defenses. Five minutes later, Kiev controller 
asked Unit4 to continue supplying grid. However, the 
ECCS was not reconnected. Although this failure did 
not contribute directly to the subsequent explosions, it 
was indicative of a lax attitude of operators towards 
the observance of safety procedures. Subsequent 
9-hour operating at around 50% full power increased 
xenon poisoning, making the plant more difficult to 
control at low power. The design of RBMK reactor 
renders it liable to positive void coefficient at power 
setting below 20% full power. After a long struggle, 
reactor power was stabilized at 7% full power. At this 
point, the test should have been stopped in view of the 
very low power setting. 
Having been released from the grid at 23:10, 
operators continued to reduce power. Operators 
omitted the order to hold power. This led to very low 
power. Operators continued to improvise in an 
unfamiliar and increasingly unstable regime to protect 
the test plan. The plant reached to super prompt 
critical, and eventually explosions occurred at 01:24.  
The low safety climate behind which many 
managerial errors and the poor design of RBMK 
reactor existed strongly affected the occurrence of this 
disastrous accident. 
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Figure 4. Classification of central nervous system into 
three systems. 
 
4. Proposal of new concept toward prevention of 
errors and accidents 
4.1 Emotion and decision making  
As shown in Figure 4, our brain can be classified 
into three systems, that is, neocortical, limbic, and 
brainstem-spinal systems. The neocortical and limbic 
systems act and work interactively as shown in Figure 
5. Damasio [17] suggested that emotion plays an 
important role in decision making. Eliot was an 
excellent business person. A part of frontal lobe was 
removed due to the brain tumor. Although his health 
condition was improved after the operation of brain 
tumor, and his motor, language, and intellectual 
functions did not differ from that before the operation. 
The intelligent quotient (IQ) was also kept high, and 
there were no deficiencies in logical thinking, 
attentional level, and memory. His personality was as 
it was before the operation. However, it was 
impossible for Eliot to express his emotional feeling 
(did not inhibit his emotional feeling intentionally) 
and make decision. Based on such observations, 
Damasio [17] concluded that there might be close 
relationship between emotion and decision making. 
Our judgment or decision is sometimes based on 
heuristics(availability，representativeness，anchoring 
and adjustment, etc.). There is evidence that emotion 
functions as heuristics. Zajonc[18] suggested that 
every perception is accompanied by some emotion. 
We frequently confront with selection problems in our 
daily life. We rarely judge reasonably by taking into 
account the advantages and the disadvantages of all 
alternatives, rather we intuitively evaluate emotional 
aspects such as “good”, “bad”, “comfortable”, or 
“uncomfortable” of alternatives, and make final 
decision. If the confronted selection problem is 
complicated, and there are less time and few cognitive 
resources to solve it, we conform to such a heuristic 
approach. In other words, it is reasonable to think that 
emotion functions as heuristics. 
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Figure 5. Interaction between neocortex (intelligence) 
and limbic system (emotion). 
 
An example which demonstrates that emotion 
works as heuristics is mentioned. In general, there is a 
positive correlation between risk and benefit. The 
larger the benefit, the lager the risk is. The smaller the 
benefit, the smaller the risk is. However, this might be 
unacceptable. When we like the activity and it induces 
positive emotion, we tend to underestimate the risk 
and overestimate the benefit. By contraries, when we 
dislike the activity and it induces negative emotion, 
we tend to overestimate the risk and underestimate the 
benefit. Shiv and Fedorikin [19] showed the following 
experimental results. Participants were required to 
memorize 2- or 7-digit number and recall this at other 
room. When moving to other room, participants were 
required to select one of the two alternatives 
(chocolate cake or fruit salad). It tended that the group 
assigned to 7-digit number selected a chocolate cake, 
and the group assigned to 2-digit number selected a 
fruit salad. It must be noted that both groups 
recognized that fruit salad is better for their health. 
The group assigned to 2-digit memory task could 
judge calmly because there were enough cognitive 
resources left as compared with the group assigned to 
7-digit memory task. 
Emotion as a means of commitment is discussed. 
In the framework of commitment problem, we show 
that leaving decision making to emotion leads to a 
better result than thinking reasonably and making 
decision. Commitment means that incentive or 
expectation is changed by giving up one or a few 
alternatives. Commitment affects own behavior. In 
other words, abandoning a few alternatives and 
affecting own or others’ future behavior corresponds 
to commitment. Imagine that you have a bag of 
20,000 yen, and your acquaintance is eager to have it. 
When your acquaintance steals your bag, you must 
make decision whether you bring a suit against him or 
her. When filing a suit, your cost including expenses 
for hiring a lawyer, and opportunity loss cost by 
（Limbic System)
thalamus・hypothalamus・amygdaloid body・A10 nerve・
reticular nuclei of braistem
“ｌive toughly”
Reflex・Accommodation
(Brainstem-spinal system)
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m
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taking a day off is more than 20,000 yen.  In this case, 
there seems to be no economic merit. Assume that you 
tend to pursuit economic benefit. If you acquaintance 
knows this and judges that you will not bring a suit 
against him or her in spite of playing a losing game, 
he or she may steal your bag. Assume that you do not 
necessarily pursuit economic benefits. If your 
acquaintance knows that you surely bring a suit 
against him or her by playing a losing game, he or she 
will never steal your bag.  
A similar example is demonstrated. Imagine 
further that you jointly run a restaurant. Your 
acquaintance is a professional of cooking, and you are 
accustomed to business administration. Both have a 
drive to deceive the partner. You have a drive to 
monopolize the benefit. Your partner also has a drive 
to a kickback from food suppliers. Either is tempted 
by the drive, and you or your partner can get larger 
profit. If both are tempted by the drive, the 
restaurant’s business situation gets worse. If both are 
honest, the restaurant’s business situation gets better. 
It is important to impress your partner that you will 
never forgive him or her (If your partner betrays you, 
you will be prepared to pursuit your partner by 
sacrificing to some extent). Such an image is 
implanted to your partner. Thus, unreasonable 
behavior which persists not in reasonability but in 
emotion leads to a better result. 
Somatic marker hypothesis proposed by 
Damasio[17] assumes that a sort of “physical sensing” 
plays an important role in inference and decision 
making. The base of this hypothesis is that some 
events, things, or places give rise to some emotional 
feeling (either positive or negative). The event, thing, 
or place is stored into a memory system together with 
the emotion. When we encounter a similar experience, 
we feel similar comfort or discomfort. Damasio [17] 
simulated a gamble to verify the hypothesis. There 
were four stacks (A，B，C，D) each of which consisted 
of many cards. Virtual money of 2000$ was provided 
to each participant, and he or she was required to earn 
as much money as possible. Every time players turned 
the card, they got some money, or a penalty was 
imposed on them. The stacks A and B were very risky. 
Although the maximum profit per card was very high 
(100$), these stacks also included cards with higher 
penalty. Concerning the risky stacks A and B, profit 
per one card was 100$, but there were some cards 
with higher penalty. As for the safe stacks C and D, 
profit per one card was low and $50, and the penalty 
was also low. Expected profit of $25 was obtained. 
The players were not informed of this structure. 
Healthy group gradually noticed that A and B were 
risky，and sooner or later tended to select C and D. 
The function of somatic marker seems to enable them 
to intuitively sense that A and B are risky. Frontal robe 
damaged group adhered to risky stacks A and B, and 
eventually got bankrupted. As the somatic marker 
does not work, it might be impossible to sense the 
danger of stacks A and B. 
Emotion, in general, tended to be avoided, and the 
following sentences represent this tendency: “Don’t be 
emotional”, “Judge calmly”, and “Emotion is an 
obstacle to reasonable decision making.” Recently, the 
important role of emotion in judgment or decision 
making has been recognized. It is impossible to judge 
or make decision properly without emotion (Damasio 
[17]). To obtain a perfectly theoretical framework on 
human’s reasonable behavior, we need to clarify how 
emotion is related to judgment or decision making. 
Our judgment or decision is made on the basis of 
heuristics (anchoring and adjustment, availability, or 
representativeness). Emotion functions as heuristic, 
and is essential for reasonable judgment or decision 
making. For the proper risk assessment and the 
prevention of human error (violation), accident or 
scandal, it must be recognized that emotion plays an 
important role. 
 
4.2 Groupthink 
Groupthink is peculiar to highly coherent groups. 
In such groups, each member is strongly attracted to 
the group, mainly due to the attractiveness of a leader, 
and comfort within the group. Decision is distorted to 
a unreasonable direction, because an agreement within 
the group is consciously obtained. The properties of 
groupthink can be summarized as follows: 
・Overevaluation of the group 
・Press group’s own moral to each member 
・Indifferent reaction to the opinion of outsider 
・Inspection to an opinion that is not mainstream 
・Pressure requiring unanimity 
As mentioned in Section 3.2, the engineering staff 
at T-company in advance pointed out the danger that 
O-ring might harden due to cold climate. If all 
concerned makers don’t agree with the launching, the 
launching cannot be carried out (very strict system). 
However, T-company agreed with the launching. The 
launch of space shuttle should have been postponed. 
Unreasonable decision making by groupthink 
occurred during this process. As the launching had 
been postponed two times, the NASA staff was 
impatient about this. The top management of 
T-company had sufficiently understood such a 
circumstance. Only their company did not agree with 
the launching. The top management of T-company felt 
sorry for such a circumstance. Eventually they fell 
into groupthink, and agreed with the launching in spite 
of recognizing the danger or risk of launching. 
 
4.3 CSR and compliance 
We should not hide an error or scold subordinate 
who committed an error. We should regard an error as 
a valuable lesson and knowledge (fortune) for the 
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progress of organization. We should behave so that an 
error would not lead to an accident or a scandal. An 
error must be conveyed to everyone (We should not 
forget an error). The organization with high resistance 
to errors or accidents, in which each member is 
educated so that he or she can be sensitive to errors or 
accidents, is vivid and active. Such an organization 
can attain high productivity (efficiency).  
CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) is a very 
important concept for preventing accidents or scandals. 
CSR includes the concept of compliance which means 
satisfaction of social request such as safety. 
Compliance plays an important role in the prevention 
of accidents or scandals which stems from violations. 
It is not until the organization satisfies social request 
that it is recognized by the society. When such an 
activity is not observed in organizations, a scandal is 
sure to occur. In active and vivid organizations, the 
top management understands the situation of each 
member. When accidents or scandals happen，the 
organization needs to identify the cause thoroughly, 
store this as knowledge data base, and carry out an 
effective measure to prevent this from occurring again. 
This corresponds to compliance. Society will not 
satisfy with an interview where top managements only 
apologize the accidents or scandals. The organization 
can evolve (become robust to accidents or scandals) 
by adapting to environment (sensitive response to 
social request). Not only top managements but also 
each organizational members must be sensitive to 
social request and responsibility so that violation can 
be avoided.  
 
4.4 Emotional intelligence (EI) and social 
intelligence (SI) 
To construct an organization with high resistance 
to errors or accidents, it is important and essential to 
raise staff with both emotional intelligence (EI) and 
social intelligence (SI). Such an organization must be 
robust to errors, accidents, and scandals. With only IQ, 
errors or accidents cannot be prevented. IQ is, of 
course, necessary for attaining high efficiency or 
producing usable products. In order to produce a good 
product which rarely induce an error, engineers must 
have SI and EI as well as IQ. Moreover, the balance 
between IQ and EQ or SI is important.  
Emotional Intelligence includes the following 
abilities: 
(a)Ability to recognize own emotion(self-recognition). 
(b))Ability to control own emotion to a moderate state 
(self-control). 
(c)Ability to enhance own feeling to attain own 
purpose (motivation). 
These abilities are the basis for the construction of 
human relation, communication ability, and sensitivity 
to errors which are described below as social 
intelligence.. 
Social intelligence (SI) consists of social 
awareness and social facility [12]. Social awareness 
refers to sensing another’s inner state to understand 
their feelings and thoughts, and includes the following 
aspects. 
・Primal empathy: Feeling with others, and sensing 
non-verbal emotional signal. 
・Attunement: Listening with full receptivity, and 
attuning to a person 
・Empathy accuracy: Understanding other’s thoughts, 
feelings, and intentions. 
・Social cognition: Knowing how the social world 
works. 
Social facility builds on social awareness to allow 
smooth and effective interactions, and includes the 
following aspects. 
・Synchrony: Interacting smoothly at the nonverbal 
level.  
・Self-presentation: Presenting ourselves effectively. 
・Influence:Shaping the outcome of social interactions. 
・Concern: Caring about others’ needs and acting 
accordingly. 
It is, of course, desirable that both IQ and EI are 
high, and the balance between the two is essential. 
This must lead to true intelligence, and it is proposed, 
in this paper, that social intelligence (SI) plays an 
important role to balance between IQ and EI and 
enhance reliability of organization or society.  
One aspect of ability to balance between IQ and EI 
might be interpreted as follows. 
(1)Recognize and understand own emotion 
(2)Inhibition of emotion (become insensitive) 
(3)Stress Management (self-control) 
(4)Motivation 
(5)Recognize and understand other’s emotion 
(6)Cope with human relation properly 
The ability to balance between IQ and EI might be 
stated in another way as follows: 
(A)Sensitive quotient (become sensitivity to errors) 
(B)Insensitive quotient (become insensitive to rumors) 
(C)Endurance quotient(ability to inhibit wicked mind） 
(D)Decision ability (related to emotion (Damasio [17] 
pointed out that emotion plays an important role in 
decision making) 
The concept of the balance between IQ and EI is 
summarized in Figure 6. It must be noted that EI and 
SI have not been so generally recognized as IQ, and 
the definition of such intelligence has not been 
systematically established. These concepts must be 
further elucidated and elaborated. Although further 
elaboration of these ideas is necessary, we believe that 
a secret to the reduction of violation lies in such a way 
of thinking and conceptualization. Next, it is discussed 
how SI would be helpful to the reduction of 
violations. 
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Figure 6. Balance between IQ and EI. 
 
4.5 SI necessary for prevention of violation 
As mentioned in 4.4, how to cope with risk and 
uncertain society must exist in the balance between EI 
and IQ (Figure 6).The following four examples are 
demonstrated to discuss how improper balance 
between IQ and EI leads to improper behavior. 
(Case1) 
Due to lack in knowledge of risk information (IQ 
aspect), we tend to sensitively react to risk 
information reported by mass media (for example, 
safety problem in nuclear power plant or Okinawa 
group suicide problem) (EQ aspect). We tend to be 
insensitive to knowledge of risk information. We tend 
to be sensitive to risk information. This corresponds to 
an unbalanced situation between IQ and EQ. It is 
possible that such an attitude leads to improper 
behavior. In such a case, we should not sensitively 
react to risk information before confirming its 
properness and reliability. Using IQ, we should first 
evaluate the risk information objectively and 
scientifically. 
(Case2) 
When a scandal or an accident occurs in an 
organization, the organizational top management tends 
to behave as follows. They leave the collection of 
information (IQ aspects) concerning the present state 
such as the distortion in organization to others, and are 
very insensitive to such an activity. However, they 
quickly tend to behave to hide the scandal or the 
accident and muzzle organizational members, and are 
very sensitive to such an activity (EQ aspect). We tend 
to be insensitive to the collection of knowledge of 
scandal or accident occurring within an organization. 
Simultaneously, we tend to be sensitive to hiding 
information related to a scandal or an accident and 
muzzling organizational members. This corresponds 
to an unbalanced situation between IQ and EQ. SI of 
such an organization does not seem to function. We 
should be insensitive to such an activity as hiding 
information on a scandal or an accident.  
(Case3) 
There exist some subordinates who sensitively 
react to being scolded by the boss and feel depressed 
easily (EQ aspect). Such persons don’t tend to pay 
attention to important information such as collection 
of customer information (IQ aspect). In other words, 
they are apt to be very insensitive to such information. 
Such an attitude would never lead to proper behavior. 
In such a situation, they should be sensitive to the 
collection of important information. Although they 
tend to sensitively react to being scolded by the boss, 
they should be insensitive to such a circumstance, and 
obediently accept what the boss advised them. 
(Case4) 
   In 2005, the Japanese House of Representative 
dissolved based not on the non-confidence of cabinet 
but on the rejection of bill on privatization of national 
post office. This was the first time in the history of 
Japanese constitutional government. Citizens were 
very insensitive to the knowledge that the dissolution 
should be carried out in order to be evaluated by 
citizens whether the cabinet in general is reliable or 
not. Once the dissolution based on a single bill is 
carried out, the House of Representative must be 
dissolved every time the discussion on a very 
important bill is in balanced situations (IQ aspects). 
Contrary to this, citizens were very sensitive to the 
meaningless catchphrase by a popular prime minister 
which was agitated by mass media (EQ aspect). 
Citizens were very insensitive to the true importance 
of knowledge or information such as significance 
concerning dissolution of House of Representative 
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Figure 7. Explanation of unbalance between IQ and EI in Case4 of Section 4.5. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Function of social intelligence to balance 
between IQ and EQ. 
 
and criticality of privatization of national post office 
(At present, citizens must have noticed that pension 
problem, medical service for super-older adults, and 
specific road fund are more important than 
privatization of national office). SI of citizens does not 
seem to work smoothly and properly. In such a case, 
we should be more sensitive to the knowledge or 
information above mentioned. Although we tended to 
be sensitive to one word catchphrase of a prime 
minister, we should be insensitive to such a 
catchphrase, and evaluate the nature of it carefully. 
The unbalanced state in this case is summarized in 
Figure 7. 
Eventually, high (proper) balancing impresses 
people and society. In art, the balance between 
technique (aspect of IQ) and artist’s emotional 
intelligence might give rise to works that impress 
many people. In sports, the balance between technique 
(aspect of IQ) and emotional intelligence of teams or 
players can create teams or players that impress many 
people. Players or teams without emotional 
intelligence cause social problems or scandals such as 
evading taxes or receiving bribe. 
Cognition of risk based on emotional and 
sensational information by mass media will be 
discussed. Is EI less important than IQ? EI is based 
mainly on peripheral rout processing. IQ is based 
mainly on central rout processing, and is related to 
motivation and ability. Information on error, accident, 
and risk is asymmetric. An example of this is lemon 
market (used car market). Reliability between sender 
and receiver of information is important. Social 
intelligence (SI) must work to balance between IQ and 
EI. These concepts are summarized in Figure 8. 
Not only IQ but also EI must be endowed with. 
Does social intelligence(SI) make this possible？To 
realize this and prevention violation and groupthink, 
social dilemma mentioned below must be solved and 
effective measure to exceed critical mass must be 
proposed. 
 
4.6 From closed (relief) society to global 
(reliability) society 
  In closed society, we can easily get relief.  
Relief corresponds to Japanese word “Wa” 
(obedience) in a narrow sense.  It is possible that 
such society easily falls into groupthink, and a 
disastrous accident or scandal might consequently 
occur. These days, our society is changing from closed 
to global society. Totalism (Globalism）requires us to 
change our mentality from relief to reliability. Such a 
situation gives rise to social dilemma [20]-[23]. Social 
dilemma means that we don’t tend to select 
cooperative behavior in spite of understanding that 
cooperative behavior is helpful and necessary. For 
each individual, taking non-cooperative behavior 
 Intelligence：Neocortex
Emotion：Paleocortex
Emotional intelligence
・Recognition of own emotion
・Control of own emotion
・Ability to enhance own feeling to 
attain own purpose
・Decision making
Balance Social Intelligence
SI plays an important role ?
Test score
Less knowledge on
dissolution and significance
of bill on privatization
of national post office
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Figure 9. From relief (closed) to reliability (global) society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Prevention of violation by construction of reliability in global society. 
 
induces more desirable results than cooperating. 
However, if all members in society or organization 
take non-cooperative behavior, undesirable results 
arise. We should not yield to social dilemma, but 
construct environment where every member can 
cooperate. If we can’t cope with global society, we 
cannot help suffering from scandals or concealments. 
This is what is called chain of unreliability. 
Insufficient social intelligence is one cause of 
violation. Ability to grasp personality, human relation, 
and reliability, or to balance between IQ and EI can 
avoid violation-based accidents or scandals. This 
ability must be closely related to social intelligence 
(SI). The concepts are summarized in Figure 9 and 
Figure 10.  
Why do we stick to one behavior, even if we know 
that such a behavior is not recommended?  This leads 
to violations or concealments. It is important to clarify 
this mechanism and propose a system that can 
effectively avoid social dilemma. The models that 
might be promising to solve such violations or social 
dilemma [20]-[23] include the following.  
(a)Modeling of social dilemma by theory of game 
[20]-[23] 
(b)Modeling of social dilemma by hyperbolic curve of 
discount [24] 
(c)Model of social dilemma by assuming limited 
reasonability of human [14]-[15] 
(d)Modeling of social dilemma by habit or instinct 
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4.7 Approach to violation prevention based on 
reliability and safety of organization 
Balance between emotional intelligence (EI) and 
intelligence (IQ) is one of the useful measures for the 
prevention of organizational violation. To facilitate an 
approach for the prevention of violation based on 
reliability and safety of organization, the following 
might be promising and effective: 
(1)Building of model on bias of social cognition 
(2)Clarifying mechanism of groupthink or violation 
It is possible that a bias of social cognition leads to 
formation of stereotype, and eventually to groupthink. 
Formation of reliability and commitment relationship 
is necessary to carry out the approaches (1) and (2) 
above. Good relationship with partner is more and 
more important under social environment with high 
uncertainty. Without this, the organization cannot be 
tolerable to unpredictable errors or accidents. 
Social environment which is formed and 
maintained by acquiring some properties includes 
uncertainty, danger, and risk. Social intelligence (SI) 
which can adequately assess the reliability of others 
must be acquired in such environment. Organizational 
manager need to acquire such ability or social 
intelligence (SI). Organizations which have many 
managers like this must be robust to accidents, 
scandals, or errors.  
 
5. Conclusions 
How serious accidents or scandals occurred due to 
human errors (especially, violation) has been 
discussed and a proper addressing measure has been 
conceptualized in the framework of social intelligence 
and distortion of decision making. A secret to prevent 
violation might exist in the elucidation of how social 
intelligence balance between IQ and EI and give rise 
to reliability of an organization. The construction of 
social structure or system that enhances social 
intelligence (SI) as an organization would be helpful 
to prevent violation-based accidents or scandals.  
Although it is believed that the traditional safety 
education can change attitudes or mind toward safety 
by means of education based on only IQ aspects，
accidents or scandals frequently occur. These 
problems including social dilemma which lead to 
violation must be approached on the basis of the full 
understanding of social system and construction of 
reliable society by means of the enhancement of social 
intelligence (SI). We believe that social intelligence 
(SI) which enables us to adapt to reliability society is 
a secret to the reduction of violation that leads to 
disastrous managerial (organizational) accidents or 
scandals. 
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